THREE YEARS OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT by BUCKLAND, E. G.
THREE YEARS OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT
E. G. BUCKLAND
The Transportation Act, 1920,1 became a law on February 28th, 1920.
It introduced into the federal legislation a new railroad policy. There-
tofore the efforts of Congress had been directed mainly to the preven-
tion of abuses, particularly those arising from excessive or discrimina-
tory rates. The Act sought to ensure, also, adequate transportation
service-hence the language in the Act, "to enable the carriers properly
to meet the transportation needs of the public," 2 to "give due considera-
tion . . . . to the transportation needs of the country, and the neces-
sity .... of enlarging .... [transportation] facilities," 3 to "best meet
the emergency and serve the public interest,"4 to "best promote the
service in the interest of the public and the commerce of the people"5
so "that the public interest will be promoted."6  Among the provisions
indicating the new policy are those relating to: I, the consolidation of
the railroads into a limited number of systems; II, the establishment of
railroad labor and adjustment boards; and III, the securing a fair
return on the capital devoted to the transportation service. These are
the principal innovations, and are the three with which this article will
deal.
I
The provisions of the act for the consolidation of the railways into a
limited number of systems was a compromise between two opinions, one
of which opposed any legislation, the other of which urged compulsory
consolidations. The former would have left the anti-trust laws in full
force and effect, the latter would have attempted to compel consolida-
tions whether or not the carriers to be consolidated were willing that
such consolidations should be made. The Act provided that the Com-
mission should prepare and adopt a plan for the consolidation of the
railway properties of the continental United States into a limited
number of systems in which competition should be preserved as fully as
possible and wherever practicable existing routes and channels of trade
and commerce should be maintained. The competitive systems so estab-
lished should be so related to each other that the values of their respec-
tive properties through which the service was rendered should be the
same so far as practicable, so that the systems could employ uniform
rates in the movement of competitive traffic, and under efficient manage-
ment earn substantially the same rate of return upon the value of their
respective railway properties. To this end the Commission employed
Professor W. Z. Ripley, of Harvard University, to make a study of the
141 Stat. at L. 456. 'Ibid. 488. 'Ibid. 477.
'Ibid. 468, 491. 4 Ibid. 477. 'Ibid. 482.
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existing railway systems of the United States and to report what con-
solidations ought to be made. Professor Ripley, after an extended
investigation, made a report to the Commission, which on August 3,
1921, issued the tentative plan dividing the country into nineteen
systems.7 After the tentative plan had been agreed upon, the Com-
mission, pursuant to the requirements of the Act, gave publicity to the
same and notice to each of the Governors of each of the states in which
any system was located, with the intention to hear all who might file or
present objections thereto. It is the purpose of the Act that after the
hearings shall have been completed the Commission shall adopt a final
plan for such consolidations, and publish the same, but it may at any
time thereafter reopen the subject for such changes or modifications as
in its judgment shall promote the public interest. When the final plan
has been adopted consolidations may be provided for in harmony with
the plan, and the carriers affected are relieved from the prohibition of
the anti-trust laws, and of all other restraints or prohibitions by law, state
or federal, in so far as may be necessary to enable them to complete the
consolidations and operate under the plan. The Commission has held
hearings generally covering the southeastern lines. At these hearings
considerable opposition has been displayed to the proposed consolida-
tions, particularly between existing competitive systems. More recently
the Commission has considered the consolidations of the lines west of
the Mississippi, and particularly those embracing the northwestern lines.
On the first of March a plan for the consolidation of the railway
systems west of Chicago into four great systems was brought forth by
Mr. Hale Holden, President of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, in
which he advocated the establishment of four systems, each operating
more than 30,000 miles of lines, with property investments of approxi-
mately $2,ooo,ooo,ooo to each group. In his plan each of the systems
would have access to the Great Lakes, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
Pacific Coast. He stated that the Burlington, the Northern Pacific, the
Great Northern, and the Colorado and Southwestern roads were ready
to consolidate if the authority of the Commission was given, and he
urged that this permission be granted so that a beginning could be made
in carrying out the consolidation provisions of the Act. The four main
systems were designated, respectively, as the Burlington, the Union
Pacific, the Santa Fe, and the Southern Pacific, and Mr. Holden showed
that in geographical extent these systems would not be materially more
widely extended than several of the systems proposed by the Commis-
sion.8
'Some of these systems-such as number 3, the Baltimore and Ohio; number 7,
the New England; and number 7a, the New England and Great Lakes-overlapped
each other, and were obviously to some extent in the alternative.
" See account of the plan in N. Y. TimEs of March 2, 1923, p. i, col. I.
It will be noted that Mr. Holden spoke only for the lines with which the
Burlington was connected or affiliated, but the development is significant in that
it indicates that there may be a tendency on the part of these carriers voluntarily
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In New England a characteristically different treatment has been
accorded the tentative plans offered for consolidation of the New
England railroads. Three alternative plans were offered by the Com-
mission:
(i) System No. 7, including all of the New England roads, except-
ing the Central Vermont, the Rutland, and the Boston & Albany (the
latter being regarded as a New York Central line), the Lehigh and
* Hudson, and the Lehigh and New England.
(2) System No. 7a, New England-Great Lakes, being the same as the
one just described, but including the Delaware & Hudson, the Ulster and
Delaware, the Delaware, the Lackawanna & Western, the Buffalo,
Rochester & Pittsburgh, the Pittsburgh & Shawmut, and the Pittsburgh,
Shawmut & Northern.
(3) System No. 3, which includes the Baltimore & Ohio, the Reading
System, the Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western, the Chicago, Indian-
apolis & Louisville, the New Haven System, the Lehigh & New England,
and the Lehigh and Hudson.9
When the tentative plans were published by the Commission, and the
Governors as required by the Act were notified, they under the invita-
tion of Governor Cox of Massachusetts appointed in each of the six
New England States an advisory committee of five to investigate rail-
road conditions in New England and to report to the Governors what
position they should take with regard to the tentative plans or to make
to follow the suggestions of the act in creating systems, each of which shall
approximate the same amount of operating mileage, to wit, between 30,o0o and
35,000 miles, of investment in road and equipment, to wit, between $2,0o0,0o0,ooo,
and $2,30ooooooo, although the net railway operating income varies from $7oo0o,-
000 to $95,ooo,ooo, and the per cent of return in the year 1922 from 3.11 to 4.22.
'Before the tentative plans were published experts were at work investigating
two possibilities,--one a plan for an exclusively New England consolidation, the
other for a plan involving the consolidation of the northern New England roads
with either the New York Central or the Delaware & Hudson and the southern
New England roads with the Pennsylvania or the Baltimore & Ohio. Mr. John -E.
Oldham, of the firm of Merrels & Oldham, presented a plan involving a sort of
holding company whereby each of the principal roads west of the Hudson should
invest in the New England roads and operate them as terminals for their respec-
tive properties, each of the lines west of the Hudson having equal operating and
traffic rights in all of the lines east of the Hudson. Mr. Oldham argued that upon
the statistics of past performance the New England roads were unable to sustain
themselves, and that the New England consolidation would only be an assembling
of financially weak roads without the ability on the part of any of them or all of
them combined to make an income which would establish the credit sufficient to
enable them to provide for the necessary additions and betterments to render ade-
quate service in the future. Those who favor the New England consolidation
refer to the obligation lying upon the Commission to fix rates so that the carriers
by groups shall earn as nearly as may be a fair return upon the value of the
properties devoted to the service of transportation, and have argued that where
within groups any carrier which is of importance to the public is not receiving a
fair return, the Commission through its power to prescribe divisions may allot to
such carrier sufficient to enable it to earn a fair return.
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suggestions for any new plans which the investigation might indicate
to be desirable. The six Committees joined forces and created a joint
committee under the chairmanship of Mr. James J. Storrow, of Boston,
also the Chairman of the Massachusetts Committee. This joint New
England committee began hearings early in the winter and has been
conducting'them ever since. The joint committee is not limiting its
efforts merely to studying consolidations of railroads, but is taking the
opportunity to investigate every activity of each of the companies.
II
The Transportation Act created 0 a Railroad Labor Board consisting
of nine members, three from the labor group representing the employees
and subordinate officials of the carriers, three from the management
group representing the carriers, and three from the public group repre-
senting the public. The Act also provides l for the establishment of
railroad boards of adjustment by agreement between any carrier, group
of carriers or the carriers as a whole, or organizations or groups of
organizations thereof, and for hearings and decisions by such boards of
adjustment upon petition for adjustment of disputes involving only
grievances, rules, or working conditions which have not been decided as
between the officers on the one hand, and employees and subordinate offi-
cials on the other, whose duty is declared to be "to exert every reason-
able effort . . . . to avoid any interruption in the operation of any
carrier."'12 The decision of the Board in the case of wage disputes
requires the concurrence of five members, of whom the member of the
Public Group must be one.13 All decisions of the Labor Board shall
be entered upon its records, immediately communicated to the parties in
dispute, and given such further publicity in such manner as the Labor
Board may determine.'4 These decisions shall establish standards of
wages and working conditions which in the opinion of the Board are
just and reasonable.' 5
Pursuant to this authority, the Labor Board has in the last three years
increased wages $595,3 8 4,342.oo, and decreased wages $513,844,4i8.oo,
leaving a net increase of $81,539,924.00, or 3.2 per cent,'" the effect of
which upon the operating expenses of the carriers will be shown here-
after.'7  In the course of the hearings before the Labor Board and
decisions thereunder, questions arose as to the authority of the Labor
Board to require carriers or employees to abide by its decisions. The
employees complained that some of the carriers, after the increase in
wages to the shopcrafts, were "contracting out" their repair work, and
1 Supra note i, at p. 470. "Ibkd. 471.
Ibid. 469. 14 Ibd. 471.
'Ibid. 469. "Ibid. 471.
"Report No. 3, U. S. Railroad Labor Board, October, 192r.
" Infra, at p. 668.
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in a few cases it was shown that the carriers, taking advantage of the
lower price of labor in outside industries, had turned over their repair
shops to other concerns, who thereupon either discharged the former
railroad employees and rehired them at a lower rate, or hired other
employees at the going rate of wages. This practice was not generally
countenanced by the railroads of the country and was indulged in by
comparatively few. It was assigned, however, as one of the reasons
for the refusal of the shopcraft employes to abide by the decision 8 of
the Labor Board decreasing by ten per cent the wages of the shopcrafts,
effective July I, 1922, and it was this decrease which was the cause of
the present shopcrafts strike.
In the meantime the Pennsylvania Railroad Company endeavored to
establish its right to deal with its own employees through representatives
who were the employees of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and to
refuse to deal with representatives who were not such employees. The
dispute, which was decided by the United States Supreme Court in
February, this year,19 arose in May, 1921, at which time the officers of
the Federated Shopcrafts of the Pennsylvania System (a labor union
of employees of that system engaged in shop work, and affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor) met the representatives of the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Company. They said they represented a majority of
the employees of the Pennsylvania System in those crafts and were
prepared to confer and agree upon rules and working conditions. The
Pennsylvania representatives refused to confer with the Federation for
lack of proof that it did represent such a majority, and said they would
send out a form of ballot to their employees asking them to designate
thereon their representatives. In the previous April, the Board had
rendered a decision, and accompanied it with a statement of principles
which it intended to follow in the consideration and settlement of
disputes between the carriers and employees, the only two important ones
for present purposes being the following :20
"The right of such lawful organization [of employees] to act toward
lawful objects through representatives of its own choice, whether
employees of a particular carrier or otherwise, shall be agreed to by
management."
"The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right
to determine what organization shall represent members of such craft
or class. Such organization shall have the right to make an agreement
which shall apply to all employees in such craft or class. No such agree-
ment shall infringe, however, upon the right of employees not members
of the organization representing the majority to present grievances
either in person or by representatives of their own choice."
"U. S. Railroad Labor Board, Decision No. O36, effective July I, 1922.
" Pennsylvania Ry. v. United States Railroad Labor Board (Feb. 1g, 1923) Oct.
T. 1922, No. 585. The facts in the case may be found in the statement by Mr.
Chief Justice Taft, pp. 1-6.
" Quoted ibid. at p. 3.
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The Federation officers objected to the proposed ballot because it was
not in accordance with these principles, in that it made no provision for
representation of employees by an organization, but specified that those
selected must be natural persons, and such only as were employees of the
Pennsylvania Company, and also because it required that the represen-
tatives of the employees should be selected regionally rather than from
the whole system. The result was that the Company and the Federation
each sent out ballots. The Federation then filed a complaint under
Section 307 of the Transportation Act,21 against the Pennsylvania
Company, complaining, on behalf of its members directly interested, of
the Company's course in respect to the ballots. The Company appeared,
a hearing was had, and the Board decided that neither of the ballots sent
out by the parties was proper; that representatives so chosen were not
proper representatives; and that rules and working conditions agreed
upon by them would be void. It further appeared that the votes cast
on the Company's ballots were only a little more than 3,000 out of
more than 33,000 employees entitled to vote. The Federation had
advised its members not to vote on the Company's ballots. What the
result was in the vote of the Federation ballots did not appear. The
persons chosen by the 3,000 votes on the Company's ballots conferred
with the Pennsylvania Company's representatives and agreed upon rules
and working conditions. The Board in its decision ordered a new
election for which rules were prescribed and a form of ballot was sped-
fled, on which labor organizations as well as individuals could be voted
for as representatives at the option of the employee. The Company
asked the Board to vacate this decision, but the Board declined to do so,
but said that it would allow the Company to be heard on the question of
the ratification 'of its shopcraft rules by representatives of the crafts
concerned when fairly selected. The Board thereupon proceeded in
accordance with the provisions of Section 31322 of the Act to prepare a
statement that the Pennsylvania .Railroad Company had violated its
decision and was preparing to make public this alleged violation. The
Pennsylvania Railroad Company asked for an injunction against the
threatened official publication, which the District Court granted. The
Labor Board appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed
the decree and directed the dismissal of the bill. The Pennsylvania
Railroad Company appealed from the Circuit Court of Appeals' decree
to the United States Supreme Court, and it was upon this issue that the
decision was rendered on February I9 th.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.
In the course of his opinion he said :23
2 Supra note i, at p. 470.
2 Ibid. at p. 473.
' Pennsylvania Ry. v. United States Railroad Labor Board, supra note 19, at pp.
6 and 7.
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"It is evident from a review of Title III of the Transportation Act
of 1920 that Congress deems it of the highest public interest to prevent
the interruption of interstate commerce by labor disputes and strikes
and that its plan is to encourage settlement without strikes, first by
conference between the parties; failing that, by reference to adjustment
boards of the parties' own choosing, and if this is ineffective, by a full
hearing before a National Board appointed by the President, upon
which are an equal number of representatives of the Carrier Group, the
Labor Group, and the Public. The decisions of the Labor Board are
not to be enforced by process. The only sanction of its decision is to
be the force of public opinion invoked by the fairness of a full hearing,
the intrinsic justice of the conclusion, strengthened by the official pres-
tige of the Board, and the full publication of the violation of such deci-
sion by any party to the proceeding. The evident thought of Congress
in these provisions is that the economic interest of every member of the
Public in the undisturbed flow of interstate commerce and the acute
inconvenience to which all must be subjected by an interruption caused
by a serious and widespread labor dispute, fastens public attention
closely on all the circumstances of the controversy and arouses public
criticism of the side thought to be at fault. The function of the Labor
Board is to direct that public criticism against the party who, it thinks,
justly deserves it."
The Court goes on to say :24
"The only question between the Company and the Federation is
whether the membership of the latter includes a majority of the
Company's employees who are interested. But it is said that the Federa-
tion is a labor union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor
and that the phrase 'organization of employees' used in the Act was
not intended by Congress to include labor unions. We find nothing in
the Act to impose any such limitation if the organization in other
respects fulfills the description of the Act. Congress has frequently
recognized the legality of labor unions . . . . and no reason suggests
itself why such an association, if its membership is properly inclusive,
may not be regarded as among the organizations of employees referred
to in this legislation."
It was also urged by the Pennsylvania Company that the question who
may represent the employees is not within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Board to decide; that these representatives must be determined before
the conferences are held; that the jurisdiction of the Labor Board does
not begin until after these conferences are held; and that the represen-
tatives who can make application are the representatives engaged in the
conference. The Court says25 that, "such a construction would give
either side an easy opportunity to defeat the operation of the Act and
to prevent the Labor Board from considering any dispute. It would
tend to make the Act unworkable. If the Board has jurisdiction to hear
representatives of the employees, it must of necessity have the power to
determine who are proper representatives of the employees. That is a
condition precedent to its effective exercise of jurisdiction at all. One
4 Ibid. at p. 8.
"Ibid. at p. 9.
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of its specific powers conferred by Section 308 is 'to make regulations
necessary for the efficient execution of the functions vested in it by this
title.' This must include the authority to determine who are proper
representatives of the employees and to make reasonable rules for ascer-
taining the will of the employees. .. ." The Court again refers to the
fact that historically, the question who may be representatives of
employees, not only before the Board, but in conferences and elsewhere,
is and always has been one of the most important questions involved in
the operation of a railroad. The purpose of Congress to promote
harmonious relations between carriers and their employees is seen in
every section of the Act, and Congress must therefore have intended to
include the procedure for determining who should be representatives of
employees as a proper subject matter to be considered by the Board.
"The Act is to be liberally construed to effect the manifest effort of
Congress to compose differences between railroad companies and their
employees, and it would not help this effort, to exclude from the lawful
consideration of the Labor Board a question which has so often seriously
affected the relations between the companies and their employees in the
past and is often encountered on the very threshold of controversies
between them." 26
To the claim by the counsel of the Company, that it has the right to
deal with individual representatives of its employees and that this is an
inherent right which cannot be constitutionally taken from it, and to the
claim of the employees, or at least those who are members of the labor
unions, that they have a lawful right to select their own representatives,
and that it is not within the right of the Company to restrict them in
their selection to employees of the Company or to forbid selection of
officers of their labor unions qualified to deal with and protect their
interests, the court said that the statute does not deprive either side of
the rights claimed, but it used this significant language :27
The law "was not enacted to provide a tribunal to determine what
were the legal rights and obligations of railway employers and employees
or to enforce or protect them. Courts can do that. The Labor Board
was created to decide how the parties ought to exercise their legal rights
so as to enable them to co6perate in running the railroad. It was to
reach a fair compromise between the parties without regard to the legal
rights upon which each side might insist in a court of law. The Board
is to act as a Board of Arbitration. It is to give expression to its view
of the moral obligation of each side as members of society to agree upon
a basis for co6peration in the work of running the railroad in the public
interest. The only limitation upon the Board's decisions is that they
should establish a standard of conditions, which, in its opinion, is just
and reasonable. The jurisdiction of the Board to direct the parties to
do what it deems they should do is not to be limited by their constitu-
tional or legal right to refuse to do it. Under the Act there is no
constraint upon them to do what the Board decides they should do except
the moral constraint, already mentioned, of publication of its decisions.
' Ibid. at p. io. 'Ibid. at pp. io and ii.
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"It is not for this or any other court to pass upon the correctness of
the conclusion of the Labor Board if it keeps within the jurisdiction
thus assigned to it by the statute. The statute does not require the
Railway Company to recognize or to deal with, or confer with labor
unions. It does not require employees to deal with their employers
through their fellow employees. But we think it does vest the Labor
Board with power to decide how such representatives ought to be
chosen with a view to securing a satisfactory co6peration and leaves
it to the two sides to accept or reject the decision. The statute provides
the machinery for conferences, the hearings, the decisions and the moral
sanction. The Labor Board must comply with the requirements of the
statute; but having thus complied, it is not in its reasonings and conclu-
sions limited as a court is limited to a consideration of the legal rights
of the parties."
The Court concludes :28
"It is not for us to express any opinion upon the merits of these
principles and decisions announced by the Board. All that we may do
in this case is to hold, as we do, that they were within the lawful func-
tion of the Board to render, and not being compulsory, violate no legal
or equitable right of the complaining company.
"For this reason, we think that the District Court was wrong in
enjoining the Labor Board from proceeding to entertain further juris-
diction and from publishing its opinions, and that the Court of Appeals
Was right in reversing the District Court and in directing a dismissal
of the bill."
This is the first time that the United States Supreme Court has
construed the powers of the Labor Board under the Transportation Act,
and in effect establishes it merely as a body of arbitrators, whose deci-
sions have no force excepting that of public opinion.
III
More important than the provisions relating to consolidations of
railroads into a limited number of systems, or the establishment of rail-
road labor and adjustment boards, are the provisions29 of the Act
imposing upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the obligation to
preserve for the nation substantially the whole transportation system by
establishing rates which will yield a fair return upon the value of the
property held for and used in the service of transportation. It will be
remembered that for the first two years of the Act, the Commission
determined that six per cent would be the fair return. 30 This was
reduced by one-quarter of one per cent after March Ist, I922,'31 at which
figure it now remains. The return is based upon the aggregate value
'Ibid. at pp. ii and 12.
"Supra note i, at p. 481 et seq.
Ex parte 74, Increased Rates, i92o (July 29, Ig2o) 58 I. C. C. 220.
Reduced Rates, 1922' (May 16, 1922) 68 I. C. C. 676.
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of the railway property held for and used in the service of transporta-
tion, and represents the amount which will remain after the payment of
operating expenses (including those for maintenance of way, structures,
and equipment). The management must be honest, efficient, and
economical. This is nothing more than the common-law right of each
carrier to be permitted to earn as a condition of service a reasonable
return upon the value of its property. But before the Transportation
Act, it had been difficult, if not impossible, for any carrier to prove
that the unwillingness of the Commission to permit an increase in a
rate, or its insistence upon the reduction of a rate, did in and of itself
deprive the carrier of such return and so confiscate its property; and so,
although carriers had in many instances been morally certain that deci-
sions of the Commission amounted to confiscation, they seldom tried out
the issue. The Transportation Act reversed the position of the Com-
mission. Instead of being a restrictive body it had to become a con-
structive body, and the mandate was laid upon it to fix rates so that the
properties of the carriers should, as nearly as may be, earn a fair return.
The first important decision of the Commission under the Act was in
Ex Parte 74, Increased Rates, 1920,32 in which, after an extended hear-
ing, the Commission, in the absence of final values found under the
Valuation Act, fixed the total value of the railroads at $I8,9oo,ooo,ooo,
and the value of those in the Eastern group at $8,8oo,ooo,ooo. It estab-
lished four groups and increased the freight rates as follows: Eastern
Group, 40 per cent; Southern Group, 25 per cent; Western Group, 35
per cent; Mountain-Pacific Group, 25 per cent, and increased passen-
ger rates :2o per cent in all groups. It has made two general decreases,
one of the hay and grain rates,33 effective January I, 1922, IO per cent,
and the other a general decrease of io per cent in all groups,34 effective
July i, 1922.
The effect of these adjustments of rates by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the adjustments of wages by the Railroad Labor
Board, is seen in the following percentage of revenues and expenses in
' Supra tnote 30.
'Rates on Grain, Grain Products, and Hay (Oct. 20, 1921) 64 I. C. C. 85.
" Reduced Rates, z922, sapra note 31, at p. 734 et seq. Effective July I, 1922, it
made a general reduction of IO per cent on all rates increased by authority of
Ex Parte 74, supra note 3o. Prior to that, the Interstate Commerce Commission
had ordered (1921, 64 I. C. C. 85, IOI) a general reduction ranging from IO to 22
per cent with respect to carload rates on grain, grain products, and hay in the
western and Mountain-Pacific groups, which became effective during January,
1922, and upon its recommendation (1921, 63 I. C. C. lO7, 118) rates on live stock
in the sarne groups in excess of 5o cents per ioo pounds had been reduced 20 per
cent, but not below 5o cents, in October, 1921. Practically all other carload rates
upon products of the farm, garden, orchard, and range throughout the country
were reduced io per cent in July, 1922. All of these reduced rates, other than
those on grain, grain products and hay in the Western and Mountain-Pacific
groups expired by tariff limitation on June 30, 1922. (See also (1922) 68 I. C. C.
676, 703.)
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the years 1920, I92i, and 1922, and the percentage of return upon the
value of the property as fixed by the Commission :35
(Millions of dollars)
1922 1921 1920
Railway operating revenues ..... 5,617 5,573 6,225
All operating expenses ......... 4,456 4,604 5,830
Taxes ........................ 305 280 281
Net Railway Operating Income.. 777 616 58
Per cent of Income to Valuation .... 4% 3.2% 0.3%
These decisions of the Commission have given rise to considerable
litigation. Five cases386 dealing with this part of the Act have come
before the United States Supreme Court.
The first case was that of North Dakota v. Chicago & North Western
Ry.3 7  In that case the State of North Dakota attempted, by an original
suit in the Supreme Court, to restrain the Chicago & North Western
Railway Company and four other railroads from applying an order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission increasing intrastate rates, in
North Dakota until the Supreme Court of the United States could
review the decision of the Commission and pass upon the constitutional
questions concerning it. This case was watched by the Bar with much
interest, not only because it was the first test of the power of Congress
over intrastate rates, but also because of the novel procedure by original
suit in the Supreme Court rather than by the method prescribed by the
Judicial Code.38 The Court in this case declined to pass upon the power
of Congress over intrastate rates, and dismissed the bill because the
'Bureau of Statistics, I. C. C. "Results of Railroad Operation in 1922," issued
February 23, 1922.
'* These five cases are discussed or referred to in the remaining part of the
present article. The other cases of importance that deal with the Transportation
Act, 192o, are Pennsylvania Ry. v. Labor Board, supra note 19, already discussed
in this article; and Texas v. Eastern Texas Ry. (1922) 258 U. S. 204, 42 Sup. Ct.
281, which construed paragraphs 18, 19, and 20 of sec. i of the Act to Regulate
Commerce-which paragraphs were added by sec. 402 Of the Transpdrtation Act
(41 Stat. at L. 456, 477)-regulating the extension, construction, and abandonment
of lines of railroad, "as not clothing the Commission with any authority over
the discontinuance of the purely intrastate business of a road whose situation and
ownership, as here, are such that interstate and foreign commerce will not be
burdened or affected by a continuance of that business." (258 U. S. at p. 218, 42
Sup. Ct. at p. 284.)
3' (Jan. 23, 1922) 257 U. S. 485, 42 Sup. Ct. 17o, aff'd. in Texas v. Interstate
Coinnerce Coin. (922) 258 U. S. 158, 42 Sup. Ct. 261.
"'The argument that we shall consider is that the suit is one to set aside or
suspend the order of the Commission, Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. State Public
Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493; that therefore by §211 of the Judicial Code
the United States must be made a party, and that the United States has consented
to be sued only in the District Court, where such suits are required to be brought.
Judicial Code, §2o8. Act of October 22, 1913, C. 32, 38 Stat. 219." Ibid. at p. 489,
42 Sup. Ct at pp. 170-171.
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state had not followed the provisions of the Judicial Code. The Court
said, 39 by Mr. Justice Holmes:
"The main contention of the State is that if in the opinion of the
Court it has a substantial right that is infringed by what the defendants
are doing Congress neither can take that right away nor prevent theState from proceeding in this Court for such remedy as law or equity
may afford.40 But if these premises were granted, it would not follow
that the bill should be maintained. It is a proceeding in equity in which
the requirements of complete justice and of public policy must be taken
into account. When they are considered it seems to us pretty clear that
the State should be remitted to the remedy offered by the statutes-a
suit in the District Court in which the United States is made a party.Complete justice requires that the railroads should not be subjected to
the risk of two irreconcilable commands-that of the Interstate
Commerce Commission enforced by a decree on the one side and that
of this Court on the other. The decision in this case although an
authority would not be res judicata, and the Commission would not be
concluded from rearguing the whole matter."
It will be observed that neither the Interstate Commerce Commission
nor the United States was made a party to this action, although the
Judicial Code requires the action to be brought against the United States
and notice to be given to the Interstate Commerce Commission and to
the Attorney General of the United States.41  Commenting upon this,
the Court concluded:
"For the reasons that we have indicated it is equitable that a decree
should not be entered except in such form as to bind the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the United States and therefore, this bill
must be dismissed. The right of the State is sufficiently protected by
its right to appeal from the decision of the District Court."
The next case that arose was that of the Ry. Commission of Wiscon-
sin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry.42 The Interstate Commerce
Commission, in Ex Parte 74,43 ordered an increase to the carriers in the
group of which the Wisconsin carriers were a part, of 35 per cent in
interstatefreight rates and 20 per cent in interstate passenger rates and
excess baggage charges, and a surcharge upon passengers in sleeping
cars amounting to 50 per cent of the charge for space in such cars to
accrue to the rail carriers. Thereupon the carriers applied to the
Wisconsin Railroad Commission for corresponding increases in intra-
state rates. The state commission granted an increase in intrastate
freight rates of 35 per cent, but denied any in intrastate passenger fares
Ibid. 490, 42 Sup. Ct. 171.4 'In all Cases .... in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction." U. S. Const. (1789) art. 3, sec. 2.
" Cf. extract from opinion quoted in note 38, supra.
42 (Feb. 27, 1922) 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232. For a discussion of this case
see COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 870.
Suepra note 30.
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and charges on the sole ground that a state statute prescribed a maxi-
mum for passengers of two cents a mile. The Interstate Commerce
Commission began a proceeding to determine whether this amounted to
undue and unreasonable discrimination against interstate commerce,
which proceeding was entitled Wisconsin Passenger Fares.4" The
Interstate Commerce Commission found45
"that all of the respondent carriers of Wisconsin transported both intra-
state and interstate passengers on the same train, with the same service
and accommodations; that the state passenger paying the lower rate
rode on the same train, in the same car, and perhaps in the same seat
with the interstate passenger who paid the higher rate; that the circum-
stances and conditions were substantially similar for interstate as for
intrastate passenger service in Wisconsin; that travelers destined to, or
coming from, points outside the State found it cheaper to pay the intra-
state fare within Wisconsin and the interstate fare beyond the border
than to pay the through interstate fare; that undue preference and
prejudice were shown by the falling off of sales of tickets from border
line points in Minnesota and Michigan to stations in Wisconsin, and by
a marked increase in sales of local tickets from corresponding border
line points in Wisconsin to stations in Wisconsin; ....
"The Commission further found that the fare necessary to fulfill the
requirement as to net income of this interstate railroad group under
§I5a was 3.6 cents per mile, and that this was reasonable, that the
direct revenue loss to the Wisconsin carriers, due to their failure to
secure the 20 per cent. increase in intrastate fares, would approximate
$2,4oo,ooo per year if the 3-cent fare fixed by the President under
federal war control, were continued, and $6,ooo,ooo per year if the
2-cent fare named in the state statute should become effective.
"The Commission found that there was undue, unreasonable and
unjust discrimination against persons travelling in interstate commerce
and against interstate commerce as a whole; and ordered that the undue
discrimination should be removed by increases in all intrastate passen-
ger fares and excess baggage charges and by surcharges corresponding
with the increases and surcharges ordered in interstate business....
"The carriers filed bills in equity .... in the District Court to enjoin
the State Railroad Commission and other state officials from interfering
with the maintenance of the fares thus ordered and published."
An interlocutory injunction was granted after hearing before three
judges.
After disposing of a preliminary question the Court, speaking through
Mr. Chief justice Taft, proceeds to the consideration of the main
question which was,46 "Are these intrastate fares an undue discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce as a whole which it is the duty of the
Cqmmission to remove?" The Court recites the history of the Inter-
state Commerce Act from its passage in 1887 down to and including the
Mann-Elkins amendment of 191o, when the Commission wa for the
(192o) 59 I. C. C. 391.
Statement in Ry. Com''ssion of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Ry., supra note 42, at pp. 565-566, 42 Sup. Ct. at pp. 233-234.
Ibid. at p. 579, 42 Sup. Ct. at p. 234-
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first time given the power to suspend rates, and the Court characterizes
the authority of the Commission thereafter in dealing with the carriers
as having been made summary and substantially complete, and then goes
on to say :
"Whatever the causes, the fact was that the carrying capacity of the
railroads did not thereafter develop proportionately with the growth
of the country, and it became difficult for them to secure additional
investment of capital on feasible terms. When the extraordinary demand
for transportation arose in 1917, the Congress and the President con-
cluded to take over all the railroads into the management of the Federal
Government, and by joint use of facilities, which the Anti-Trust Law
was thought to forbid under private management, and by use of Govern-
ment credit, to increase their effectiveness. This was done by appro-
priate legislation and executive action under the war power. From
January I, 1918, until March I, 1920, when the Transportation Act went
into effect, the common carriers by steam railroad of the 'country were
operated by the Federal Government. Due to the rapid rise in the prices
of material and labor in 1918 and I919, the expense of their opera-
tion had enormously increased by the time it was proposed to return the
railroads to their owners. The owners insisted that their properties
could not be turned back to them by the Government for useful opera-
tion without provision to aid them to meet a situation in which they
were likely to face a demoralizing lack of credit and income. Congress
acquiesced in this view. The Transportation Act of "I92O was the
result. It was adopted after elaborate investigations by the Interstate
Commerce Committees of the two Houses."
In another part of its opinion the Court points out4 s that
"The new measure imposed an affirmative duty on the Interstate
Commerce Commission to fix rates and to take other important steps to
maintain an adequate railway service for the people of the United
States....
Intrastate rates and the income from them must play a most impor-
tant part in maintaining an adequate national railway system. Twenty
per cent, of the gross freight receipts of the railroads of the country are
from intrastate traffic, and fifty per cent of the passenger receipts. The
ratio of the gross intrastate revenue to the interstate revenue is a little
less than one to three. If the rates, on which such receipts are based,
are to be fixed at a substantially lower level than in interstate traffic,
the share which the intrastate traffic will contribute will be proportion-
ately less. If the railways are to earn a fixed net percentage of income,
the lower the intrastate rates, the higher the interstate rates may have to
be. The effective operation of the act will reasonably and justly require
that intrastate traffic should pay a fair proportionate share of the cost of
maintaining an adequate railway system."
The Court says that" "Section 15a confers no power on the Commis-
sion to deal with intrastate rates," but in another part of the Act, to
wit, Section 13, paragraph 4, the Commission is vested with a direct
'Ibid. at pp. 582-584, 42 Sup. Ct. at pp. 235-236.
' Ibid. at pp. 585-586, 42 Sup. Ct. at p. 236.
' Ibid. at p. 586, 42 Sup. Ct. at p. 236.
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power to remove undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination against
interstate or foreign commerce. The Court remarks5" that
". .... it is impossible to escape the dovetail relation between that
provision and the purpose of §15a. If that purpose is interfered with
by a disparity of intrastate rates, the Commission is authorized to end
the disparity by directly removing it, because it is plainly an undue,
unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign
commerce, within the ordinary meaning of those words....
"Effective control of the one must embrace some control over the
other in view of the blending of both in actual operation. The same
rails and the same cars carry both. The same men conduct them.
Commerce is a unit and does not regard state lines, and while, under the
Constitution, interstate and intrastate commerce are ordinarily subject
to regulation by different sovereignties, yet when they are so mingled
together that the supreme authority, the Nation, cannot exercise com-
plete effective control over interstate commerce without incidental regula-
tion of intrastate commerce, such incidental regulation is not an inva-
sion of state authority or a violation of the proviso....
"Congress as the dominant controller of interstate commerce may,
therefore, restrain undue limitation of the earning power of the inter-
state commerce system in doing state work....
"It is said that our conclusion gives the Commission unified control
of interstate and intrastate commerce. It is only unified to the extent
of maintaining efficient regulation of interstate commerce under the
paramount power of Congress. It does not involve general regulation
of intrastate commerce."
The order of the District Court, granting the interlocutory injunction,
was therefore affirmed.
The next case was that of the State of New York v. United States,"
involving the question whether a charter fare-limiting contract between
a railroad and a state can be set aside by the provisions of the Transpor-
tation Act. It will be remembered that the Wisconsin case dealt with
the statute of the State prescribing a two cent rate. The New York
case raised the question whether the charter contract between the state
and the New York Central, providing for a two-cent passenger rate
between Albany and Buffalo, can be set aside by the order of the Com-
mission. The state contended that if the Transportation Act permits
the Interstate Commerce Commission, by an order increasing the rate to
3.6 cents, to violate the New York Central's charter contract with the
state, such an act impairs the obligation of a contract and is in violation
of Section IO, Article I, of the federal Constitution. The Court says
5 2
that the section referred to "provides that no State shall . . . . pass
any .... law impairing the obligation of contracts, and does not in terms
restrict Congress or the United States." In answer to the objection
that it deprives New York and her people of property without due
Ibid. at pp. 586, 588-589, 590, 42 Sup. Ct at pp. 237, 238.
(Feb. 27, 1922) 257 U. S. 59x, 42 Sup. Ct. 239.
Per Taft, C. J., ibid. at p. 6oi, 42 Sup. Ct. at p. 24o. Italics are the Court's.
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process of law, the Court cites53 precedent to the fact that "anything
which directly obstructs and thus regulates that commerce which is
carried on among the States, whether it is state legislation or private
contracts between individuals or corporations, should be subject to the
power of Congress in the regulation of that commerce." Therefore
the Court concludes, as in the Wisconsin case, that the fact of the
charter contract between the state and the New York Central is not
controlling and if the lower level of intrastate rates and fares is main-
tained, the Commission has found that it will be discriminating against
interstate commerce, in that it will require higher fares and rates in the
interstate commerce of the state to secure the income for which the
Commission must attempt to provide by fixing rates under the Transpor-
tation Act so as to provide the people of the United'States with adequate
transportation.
Then followed The New England Divisions Case, 4 with a discussion
of which this article closes. In that case the roads west of the Hudson
River contended that, while the Commission undoubtedly had the right
to fix rates adequate to earn a fair return, it did not have the right where
its purpose was not to establish divisions just, reasonable and equitable,
as between connecting carriers, but, in the public interest, to relieve the
financial needs of the New England lines so as to keep them in effective
operation. The argument was that 'Congress did not authorize the
Commission to exercise its power to accomplish that purpose, but Mr.
Justice Brandeis, writing the opinion for a unanimous Court (as, indeed,
have been all the opinions construing the Transportation Act), said in
the course of the opinion :5
Upon the Commission, new powers were conferred and new duties
were imposed.
"The credit of the carriers, as a whole, had been seriously impaired.
To preserve for the nation substantially the whole transportation system
was deemed important. .. . A general rate increase alone would not
meet the situation. There was a limit to what the traffic would bear....
Moreover, it was not clear that the people would tolerate greatly
increased rates (although no higher than necessary to produce the
required revenues of weak lines) if thereby prosperous competitors
earned an unreasonably large return upon the value of their properties.
The existence of the varying needs of the several lines and of their
widely varying earning power was fully realized. It was necessary to
avoid unduly burdensome rate increases and yet secure revenues ade-
quate to satisfy the needs of the weak carriers. To accomplish this
two new devices were adopted: the group system of rate making and
the division of joint rates in the public interest. Through the former,
weak roads were to be helped by recapture from prosperous competitors
of surplus revenues. Through the latter, the weak were to be helped
by preventing needed revenue from passing to prosperous connections."
'Ibid. at p. 6ol, 42 Sup. Ct. at p. 240, quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States (1899) 175 U. S. 211, 23o, 2o Sup. Ct. 96, 103.
(923) 43 Sup. Ct. 270.
'Ibid. at p. 4.
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The opinion pointed out that the deficiency in income of the New
England roads in 1920 was so great as to necessitate an increase in
freight revenues of 47.40 per cent if a fair return were to be secured;
in Trunk Line territory, 29.76 per cent; and in Central Freight Asso-
ciation territory, 24.31 per cent. Instead of erecting New England
into a separate rate group, which would have involved large 4ncreases
in rates local to New England and might have killed New England
traffic, the Commission placed New England, with the other two sub-
divisions of Official Classification Territory, into the Eastern Group;
and ordered that freight rates in that group be raised 40 per cent. "At
that rate level the revenues of the carriers in Trunk Line and Central
Freight Association territories would, it was asserted, exceed by 1.48
per cent what they would have received if they had been a separate
group. It was estimated that the excess would be about $25,000,000
annually. Substantially that amount (besides the additional revenue
to be raised otherwise) was said to be necessary to meet the needs of
the New England lines."5
After pointing out the power granted by Section 15, Paragraph (6),
of the Transportation Act,5 7 to the Commission to give due considera-
tion in determining divisions to the importance to the public of the
transportation services of such carriers, the Court, referring to the con-
tention of the Trunk Lines, says :58
"The argument is that the division of a joint rate is essentially a
partition of property; that the rate must be divided on the basis of the
services rendered by the several carriers; that there is no difference
between taking part of one's just share of a joint rate and taking from
a carrier part of the cash in its treasury; and, thus, that apportionment
according to needs is a taking of property without due process. But
the argument begs the question. What is its just share?-It is the
amount properly apportioned out of the joint rate. That amount is to
be determined, not by an agreement of the parties or by mileage. It is
to be fixed by the Commission; fixed at what that board finds to be
just, reasonable and equitable. Cost of the service is one of the ele-
ments in rate making....
"What the Commission did was to raise the additional revenues needed
by the New England lines, in part, directly, through increase of all rates
40 per cent and, in part, indirectly, through increasing their divisions
on joint rates. In other words, the additional revenues needed were
raised partly by a direct, partly by an indirect tax. It is not true, as
argued, that the order compels the strong railroads to support the weak.
No part of the revenues needed by the New England lines is paid by
the western carriers. All is paid by the community pursuant to the
single rate increase ordered in Ex parte 74. If, by a single order, the
Commission had raised joint rates throughout the Eastern Group 40
per cent, and, in the same order, had declared that 90 per cent of the
whole increase in the joint rates should go to the New England lines
(in addition to what they would receive under existing divisions),
Ibid. at p. 7.
' Supra note i, at p. 486.
:' State of New York v. United States, supra note 51, at p. 8 et seq.
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clearly nothing would have been taken from the Trunk Line and Central
Freight Association carriers, in so ordering. The order entered in
Ex Parte 74 was at all times subject to change. The special needs of
the New England lines were at all times before the Commission. That
these needs were met by two orders instead of one is not of legal signifi-
cance."
This was the gist of the Divisions Case. Other points made by the
Commission, that no order could be issued until specific divisions were
prescribed for each carrier, were dismissed with this statement :59
"Obviously, Congress intended that a method should be pursued by
which the task, which it imposed upon the Commission, could be per-
formed. The number of carriers which might be affected by an order
of the Commission, if the power granted were to be exercised fully,
might far exceed six hundred; the number of rates involved, many
millions. The weak roads were many. The need to be met was urgent.
To require specific evidence, and separate adjudication, in respect to
each division of each rate of each carrier, would be tantamount to deny-
ing the possibility of granting relief."
As briefly, the Court dealt with the contention that the order directed
a transfer of revenues of the western carriers to the New England
carriers, pending a decision in the matter of divisions. The Court
pointed out60 that
"To grant under such circumstances immediate relief, subject to later
readjustments, was no more a transfer of revenues pending a decision,
than was the like action, in cases involving general increases in rates, a
transfer of revenues from the pockets of the shippers to the treasury of
the carriers. That the order is not obnoxious to the due process clause,
because provisional, is clear. If this were not so, most temporary
injunctions would violate the Constitution."
The Court likewise sustained the Commission in dealing with the
main or primary divisions of the joint rates at the Hudson River and
leaving the carriers both East and West of that line to rearrange their
divisions among themselves.
The scope of the opinion in the Divisions Case is as broad as, if not
broader than, that contended for by the New England railroads. It
justifies every common carrier, which is of importance to the public,
in demanding that its rates shall so be fixed, either through increafses or
divisions, that it may, under honest, efficient and economical manage-
ment, earn a fair return upon the value of its property held for and
used in the service of transportation.
5 Ibid. at p. io.
"Ibid. at p. 13.
